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TIME: Almanac 1993
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TIME Almanac 1993.iso
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0409007.000
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1992-08-28
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WORLD, Page 48America AbroadThe Cheerleaders of Tragedy
By Strobe Talbott
In trying to vote themselves out of the U.S.S.R. three weeks
ago, the members of the Lithuanian parliament were making three
statements: Here is what our people want; here is what we
deserve; here is how to get it. They were right, right and
wrong.
Kremlinologists have been wondering for months whether there
are any "red lines" beyond which the military, the KGB, the
Communist Party and Soviet public opinion will simply not let
Mikhail Gorbachev go. The Lithuanians gambled that for them,
at least, the answer was no. Gorbachev has replied that for him
and for now, the red line is the border of the U.S.S.R. as it
has existed since the end of World War II. Yet at the same
time, he has acknowledged that the Baltic peoples are entitled
to independence. Therein lies the nub both of the crisis and
a possible solution.
A squabble has broken out in Washington between resident
Soviet casuists and American cheerleaders for the breakup of
the evil empire.
Clever Soviet: You should support Gorbachev because he, like
Abraham Lincoln, is trying to keep our country together.
Cleverer American: Cut it out! The Union cause was just. The
South had not been illegally, forcibly annexed. Stop implicitly
comparing George Washington with Joe Stalin!
Touche, Ivan. But the argument is worth following one more
step. Gorbachev has infinitely greater might on his side than
Lincoln did in the Civil War, but considerably less right. And
he knows it. Unlike Lincoln, Gorbachev has already conceded
secession in principle. His ever droll spokesman, Gennadi
Gerasimov, talks about divorce. By setting a price on its
property in Lithuania, Moscow has opened negotiations on
alimony.
Gorbachev is putting in place a procedure that may, if he
is around to see it through, give each republic a choice:
autonomy in a confederation or, after a transitional period,
a separate state. That is probably the best he can offer the
Lithuanians. It is also probably the most they can get from
him, or from any Kremlin leader. By sticking to their
unilateral declaration of independence, they risk everything,
not just for themselves but for the more cool-headed
Estonians, whose adroit step-by-step approach toward the same
goal has a far greater chance of success.
During this episode, George Bush has displayed his favorite
quality, prudence, to good effect. He understands that politics
is a matter of being right about ends as well as means, of
recognizing limits as well as obligations and opportunities.
The last thing Bush wants is to repeat the mistake that the
Eisenhower Administration made in 1956 when it egged on the
Hungarian freedom fighters, leading many of them to die in the
expectation of more help than the West could possibly provide.
Bush has correctly concentrated on persuading Gorbachev to
avert bloodshed and work toward a compromise. To urge him to
grant Lithuania the instant annulment it demands would be
futile and, as they say in Washington, counterproductive.
The Lithuanians have shown more political courage than
political wisdom. Neither quality has been much in evidence
from those members of the U.S. Congress who have called for
formal recognition of a free Lithuania. Such a thing should and
may someday exist, but it cannot be voted into existence by
legislators in either Vilnius or Washington in defiance of
Moscow. By applauding a morality play as though it were itself
a happy ending, Congress is only increasing the chances that
it will turn into a tragedy.